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Abstract—Modern vehicles contain a complex network of com-
puter systems, which makes security considerations a necessary
part of the design process. Due to a vehicle’s long deployment
phase, static security solutions become obsolete and ineffective
over time. Research has mostly focused on how to improve
security in vehicles, however, not addressing the need to keep
security solutions effective during the entire lifetime of a vehicle.
In order to address the changing environment there is a need to
create strategies for architectural components, security mecha-
nisms, and update processes that together enable the evolution of
the security mechanisms themselves. Our approach is to analyze
security mechanisms for how they can fail and what this means
from a security evolution perspective. Based on this analysis we
can then create solutions in order to evolve deployed security
mechanisms over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicles have evolved into complex computer systems con-
taining up to 100 different Electronic Control Units (ECUs)
of which many are interconnected. These ECUs provide
functionality for different types of tasks that have different
requirements, e. g. low latency or high bandwidth. As a result,
the internal network infrastructure in vehicles has evolved to
contain several different bus systems that provide different
properties for different use cases. In addition, modern automo-
biles also provide wireless and wired interfaces to the outside
world including Bluetooth, WLAN, cellular networking, on-
board diagnostic ports (OBDs), USB, and many more. These
technologies enable useful services and functionalities, but on
the other hand also create new attack surfaces for potential
attackers. Especially the wireless interfaces to the outside
world open up possibilities for remote attacks.
With these new attack surfaces, it is consensus that security
mechanisms are an important aspect to add to the on-board
infrastructure, and literature knows a vast number of propos-
als on how to enhance automotive security (e. g. [1], [2]).
However, automotive security is challenged by the very long
life cycles of vehicles and also by their safety requirements,
which mandate a conservative approach to making changes
to deployed vehicles. Thus, for every modification it needs
to be ensured that no regressions or flaws are introduced
into the safety-critical components, similar to other safety-
critical fields such as industrial control systems (ICS) [3]. This
conservative approach to automotive IT systems engineering
conflicts with the typical approach in IT security, where
security mechanisms age, need to be enhanced or replaced,
and fast reaction to new attacks is required.
This contradiction is what we address in our work on
security evolution. Within this work we have split our aims
into two separate categories:
1) the identification and categorization of security mecha-
nisms and problems in an automotive systems’ life cycle,
and
2) the proposal of flexible ways for security mechanisms
and architectures to evolve during the life cycle of a
vehicle in order to always maintain the required level of
security.
The process of security evolution needs to keep security
mechanisms in a vehicle updateable and secure at all layers,
from hardware to software, and also involves external compo-
nents, such as public key infrastructures (PKIs). In this paper
we present a categorization of domains that security evolution
needs to address.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II gives a brief overview of security in modern vehicles,
Section III categorizes security mechanisms and potential
failures, and finally Section IV concludes this paper.
II. SECURITY IN MODERN VEHICLES
Security in vehicles can be categorized into on-board se-
curity and V2X communication security (vehicle-to-vehicle
and vehicle-to-infrastructure). This work is applicable to both
categories, as it focuses on security systems, mechanisms,
and components deployed inside a vehicle, which are used to
secure the entire infrastructure, i. e. both on-board and V2X
security.
ECUs in modern vehicles can be categorized into power-
train, chassis, body and comfort, and driver assistance and
safety. As part of the comfort category, a vehicle can contain
systems for infotainment (e. g. navigation systems and radio)
and telematics units, which are connected to backend servers
via a cellular network (e. g. GM’s OnStar). Future extensions
may introduce other V2X capabilities such as vehicular ad
hoc networks (VANETs), for example using dedicated short
range radio communication (DSRC) for cooperative safety
applications.
The infotainment, telematics, and in general V2X systems
provide attack surfaces for remote attacks. Especially telemat-
ics units have been targeted by previous work to gain access
to the on-board vehicular system via cellular communication
[4], [5], [6] and thus allowing the attacker to remain at a safe
distance.
On the other hand, the on-board system provides an attack
surface for controlling various aspects of the vehicle, including
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safety-critical functionalities, such as the brakes and throttle.
Attacks have focused on the ability to extract arbitrary data
from ECUs by reading their memory and flashing ECUs with
malicious code. Attacks have also exploited the ability to
replay messages and arbitrarily spoof messages on the CAN
bus [6], [7].
As VANETs are not yet deployed, there are no real attacks,
but research and development has addressed security (and
privacy) from the start. The IEEE 1609.2 standard [8] specifies
the use of a PKI in order to equip vehicles with certificates that
allow to sign messages between the communicating partners
in order to ensure integrity.
In order to protect against malicious modifications of ECU
software and unauthorized spoofing of messages, the most
important aspects of security for on-board vehicular systems
is to provide integrity, authentication, authorization, and avail-
ability. Therefore, research has proposed how to secure in-
vehicle networks, both in securing the network itself, such
as CAN, and in creating a secure architecture for on-board
systems [9], [10].
In summary, while risk levels may differ substantially
depending on the field of application, security mechanisms
ensuring especially integrity, authentication, authorization, and
availability (and to a lesser extent confidentiality) require evo-
lutionary capabilities independent of the compartment where
they are used.
III. SECURITY EVOLUTION
To approach security evolution in a meaningful way, one
first needs to assess and categorize security mechanisms in
vehicles and V2X systems. Therefore, we performed a sys-
tematic security and risk analysis of security technologies
and systems used in vehicles at all layers, e. g. hardware,
software, cryptography, architecture, protocols, and network
technologies.
Based on this analysis, we examine possible causes that
result in a necessary evolution of security mechanisms. We
categorize the involved security mechanisms and potential
security failures into:
a) Configuration: One of the biggest problems for
security is complexity. Unfortunately security mechanisms
often are very complex and difficult to configure. It is easy
to make mistakes, for example when configuring firewall
and intrusion detection rules, or access control lists. This
problem is also evident on the OWASP Top 10 list [11]
with ”Security Misconfiguration” being the fifth most critical
web application security flaw. One mistake often allows
an attacker to completely circumvent the entire security
mechanism. Common misconfigurations are: displaying error
handling messages back to the user (e. g. SQL errors),
enabled directory listings in web servers, running production
software in debug mode, using default key material and
passwords, or misconfiguring firewall rules.
b) Software implementation: Software implementations
of security mechanisms in ECUs may have design flaws or
bugs, which can allow attackers to circumvent a security
mechanism. Classical buffer overflows are one example,
which were also used in the prominent Heartbleed attack on
OpenSSL. Another implementation bug in OpenSSL was used
by the FREAK attack, which allowed a man-in-the-middle
attacker to enforce the usage of weak RSA keys, which the
attacker could then crack.
c) Security protocols: Security protocols are secure
versions of communication protocols, i. e. they protect the
interaction between communicating agents; in the case of
vehicular systems this applies to both on-board and V2X
communication. Communication protocols are subject to
various attacks, such as replay, impersonation, and man-in-
the-middle attacks. In order to protect against these attacks,
security protocols can become very complex, and it is easy to
accidentally overlook an aspect or define false assumptions,
which then results in possible attacks. These can be subtle
mistakes that are only discovered years later. A well-known
example is WEP: after it was standardized and deployed, the
first attacks were found, which were based on wrong usage
of the RC4 cipher [12]. Another well-known example is the
Needham-Schroeder protocol [13], where Denning and Sacco
pointed out an attack a few years later [14].
d) System security: System security mechanisms
deployed on the ECU level may be insufficient. For example,
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) may fail, if
not properly implemented or if more sophisticated attacks
become available.
e) Symmetric cryptography (including hash functions
and random number generation): As recently seen with
SHA-1 [15], attacks against cryptographic symmetric ciphers
and hash functions may become more sophisticated or
powerful, and mechanisms considered secure five years ago
may not be nowadays. Beyond, even if the algorithm itself
is still secure, key lengths may not be appropriate after
some some years from now. As an extreme example, many
implementations use AES with 128-bit keys; in case of the
successful construction of large quantum computers, it is
necessary to change the key length to 256-bits due to Grover’s
algorithm [16], which (from a brute-force search point of
view) cuts the number of bits in half, i. e. a 128-bit key can
be recovered in 264 steps.
f) Asymmetric cryptography: The same that applies
to symmetric cryptography applies also to asymmetric
cryptography. We discuss it separately as the mechanisms are
often fundamentally different and key lengths substantially
longer. A prominent example in this category is the Logjam
attack on TLS [17]: this attack used the fact that many servers
were using a single 512-bit group for the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange, which the researchers then precomputed. They
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were then able to calculate the key from the key exchange.
The solution to this problem is to use 2048-bit or larger
primes, thus creating the need to update the key material in
the field.
g) Hardware security modules and functions: For
performance and cost reasons, some of the mechanisms
listed above are cast in (immutable) hardware; in this case
replacement is not straightforward. Even if flexible hardware
like FPGAs are used, their performance limitations may
hinder deployment of more powerful mechanisms, and cost
constraints prevent proactive deployment of hardware with
spare performance.
h) Backend security functions and trusted third parties:
Security functions embedded into (web-based) backend
systems form another part of the security architecture, most
notably PKIs, but also authentication and authorization
mechanisms. These backend functions are easier to update in
case of compromise. However, retaining interoperability with
the deployed fleet is one challenge, as well as the failure of a
root of trust (e. g. a compromised root CA). The latter case
removes the possibility of trustworthy remote interaction with
deployed vehicles.
As this list shows, security mechanisms pervade all parts
of vehicular architectures. Security evolution capabilities must
also become part of all these components in order to be able
maintain the state of security. However, the examples given
above show that implementing security evolution may not be
straightforward in many cases and require further research.
Our next step is to focus on the categories one by one,
analyze their requirements, technologies, risk structures, de-
sign strategies, methods, and architectures with focus on the
evolutionary process of the specific security mechanisms.
Often, security evolution cannot be retrofitted but needs to
be an initial capability and part of the system architecture.
For example, if modification of keys is required, one needs to
identify ways to do this without compromising the integrity
of the key store. On the software level, implementations need
to be structured in a flexible manner without hard coding
assumptions on key size, cipher mode, and the cipher itself.
Security evolution strategies can be split into two different
categories: proactive architectural components and secure up-
date mechanisms. Proactive architectural components are put
into place in order to allow the evolution of security mecha-
nisms without compromising their security. They are based on
foreseeable security problems and provide proactive means for
flexibility, for example by replacing a cipher with a stronger
one. On the other hand, secure update mechanisms provide
generic strategies on how to perform updates in a deployed
system. These strategies entail the requirement for secure and
verified updates, and thus especially involve authentication,
authorization, and integrity considerations. Considering the
compromise of root CAs makes this a non-trivial task.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed that the modern vehicle is in
need of security mechanisms for both on-board and V2X
systems. However, the long life cycle of automotive systems
contradicts with the ageing of security mechanisms. As a re-
sult, deployed security mechanisms cannot guarantee security
properties in the long run. Consequently, security solutions
need to incorporate solutions on how to evolve deployed
security mechanisms in order to keep them up-to-date. This is
especially difficult in the domain of safety-critical automotive
systems, which require a conservative engineering approach.
Moreover, we discussed that the introduction of these security
evolution mechanisms are not straightforward and require
further research. With this contribution, we highlight the need
for security evolution and establish it as a future line of
research in automotive security.
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